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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
 Anthony Ottilio appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his civil case. We will 
affirm. 
I 
 Ottilio and his company, Ottilio Properties, LLC, owned several properties that 
were foreclosed upon. Thereafter, Ottilio filed an 11-count complaint alleging that his 
lawyer and banker duped him into executing cross-collateralized mortgages that 
empowered the bank to foreclose on all of his properties after he defaulted on just one 
mortgage. Nine of Ottilio’s claims were based on state law, while two claims alleged 
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c) and (d).  
 The District Court dismissed Ottilio’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that Ottilio had failed to state a federal claim under RICO 
and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Specifically, 
the Court determined that Ottilio did not properly allege a predicate act of racketeering 
activity as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1) and 1962(c). Although Ottilio alleged mail 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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or wire fraud as a predicate act, he did not provide any specificity regarding the purpose 
of the wires or mailings; nor did he allege who sent them, when they were sent, or how 
they fit into the purported fraudulent scheme. As an alternative (and independent) ground 
for dismissal, the Court noted that Ottilio alleged only a single scheme, not the multiple 
predicate acts required by the statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c). Ottilio appeals. 
II1 
 Ottilio’s arguments are largely nonresponsive to the District Court’s stated reasons 
for dismissal. He first argues that he properly alleged mail or wire fraud as a predicate act 
because innocent mailings in furtherance of a RICO scheme can satisfy that requirement. 
But the District Court did not dismiss because Ottilio alleged only an innocent mailing—
it dismissed because he did not allege mail or wire fraud with any particularity at all. In 
his brief, Ottilio claims that he “satisfied the wire and mail requirements of pleading a 
RICO cause of action” by alleging merely: 
24. All Defendants acted in connection with a common enterprise that 
affecting [sic] interstate commerce. 
 
25. The Defendants used the U.S. mails and wirings sent or delivered 
through private or commercial interstate carriers in furtherance of their 
enterprise. 
 
Ottilio Br. 14–15. These averments fall well short of the requirement that the facts 
pleaded be “sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Bare allegations such as these are insufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss, especially given that a RICO predicate act of mail or wire fraud must be 
pleaded with even greater particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 
F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2006). 
 Nor is Ottilio’s second argument persuasive. He claims that he successfully alleged 
a pattern of racketeering—that is, at least two occurrences of a predicate act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(5)—because one Appellee-Defendant, a bank employee, was convicted of 
accepting bribes in exchange for selling bank property at a reduced price. This argument 
is inapposite. Although the bribery conviction reflects poorly on the bank employee (and 
perhaps the bank), it sheds no light on whether Ottilio’s bank and his law firm conspired 
to defraud victims of their property on multiple occasions. Indeed, as the District Court 
recognized, Ottilio was unable to name a single other alleged victim of the alleged RICO 
enterprise at oral argument. Merely pointing out that a bank employee has accepted 
bribes, without averring any facts linking that crime to the alleged RICO violations, falls 
short of the “facial plausibility” needed to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678. 
 In sum, the District Court noted two related shortcomings in Ottilio’s pleading and 
each sufficed to dismiss his RICO claims. And after dismissing the federal claims, the 
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District 
Court. 
